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Abstract
At the Dolev-Yao level of abstraction, security protocols can be specied using
multisets rewriting. Such rewriting can be modeled naturally using proof search
in linear logic. The linear logic setting also provides a simple mechanism for gen-
erating nonces and session and encryption keys via eigenvariables. We illustrate
several additional aspects of this direct encoding of protocols into logic. In partic-
ular, encrypted data can be seen naturally as an abstract data-type. Entailments
between security protocols as linear logic theories can be surprisingly strong. We
also illustrate how the well-known connection in linear logic between bipolar for-
mulas and general formulas can be used to show that the asynchronous model of
communication given by multiset rewriting rules can be understood, more naturally
as asynchronous process calculus (also represented directly as linear logic formulas).
1 Introduction
When the topic of specifying and reasoning about security protocols attracts
the attention of programming language researchers, it is common to nd them
turning to process calculi, such as CSP or the spi-calculus [1,10], automata,
and even typed -calculus [17]. Proof search (that is, the foundations of logic
programming), however, has a number of properties that are attractive when
one attempts to specify and analyze security protocols. We list a few of these
advantages here and devote the rest of this paper to develop these benets
further.
Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on a set of assump-
tions commonly referred to as the Dolev-Yao model [7], an abstraction that
supports symbolic execution and reasoning. It has been observed various
places (for example, [6,4]) that this abstract can be realized well using multiset
rewriting. Given that it is well-known that proof search in linear logic pro-
vides a declarative framework for specifying multiset rewriting [8,4], a rather
transparent start at representing security primitives is available with proof
search in linear logic.
c
2003 Published by Elsevier Science B. V.
18
CC BY-NC-ND license.  Open access under 
Miller
Proof theory comes with a primitive, declarative, and well understood
notion of \newness" and \freshness" via the technical devices of eigenvariable
(newness in proofs) and -abstraction (newness in terms). It is appealing to
try to use these devices rather than the more ad hoc approach to freshness,
say, in the BAN logic [3]. Proof search has been used successfully to specify
transitions in the -calculus [15]: ad hoc provisos needed to make certain that
names and scope were maintained correctly can be encoded in a meta-logic by
mapping names to term-level abstractions (-abstractions) and to proof-level
abstractions (eigenvariables).
Proof search in linear logic has been studied extensively and proof systems
exist that give strong normal forms to how search can actually proceed [2,13].
As a result, signicant information is known about the structure of cut-free
proofs: since these are the \traces" of protocols and attackers, this structural
information is a great aid in reasoning about possible computation paths.
The proof search paradigm comes equipped with notions of abstract data-
types [11] and higher-order predicate abstractions [16], all features that we
shall draw upon in this paper. Given that these abstraction mechanism all
result from aspects of logic, there is no problem in understanding the inter-
action between abstractions and other aspects of the logic (for example, with
multiset rewriting).
Finally, logic comes with a built-in notions of entailment and of equiva-
lence and it is interesting to see if these notions can be used to reason about
computation. This notion of logical equivalence would, for example, replace
the notion of structural equivalence in process calculus [12]. When one al-
lows rich forms of higher-order quantication, logical entailment is capable of
relating surprisingly dierent specications.
2 Multiset rewriting in proof search
To model multiset rewriting we shall use a subset of linear logic called process
clauses in [12]. Such clauses can be dened simply as follows: If G and H are
formulas composed of ?,
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
..
, and 8 and such that all free variables of G are free
in H, then the closed formula 8x[G ÆH] is a process clause or just clause for
short. Here,
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encodes as the multiset constructor and ? encodes the empty
multiset, H is the head of the clause, and G is the body of the clause. We will
follow the common practice from the logic programming literature of writing
the head of a clause rst by reversing the sense of the implication: that is, the
clause above is written as 8x[H Æ  G]. Kanovich [9] introduced a similar set
of formulas and called them linear Horn clauses: these are essentially process
clauses in contrapositive form (replace
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, 8, ?, and Æ  with 
, 9, 1, and  Æ,
respectively). We avoid using Kanovich's term here since it is contrary to the
usual use of the term Horn clause in the logic programming literature where
eigenvariables are not part of proof search.
Using simple linear logic equivalences, process clauses can be written in
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normal form as
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where n;m  0, a
1
; : : : ; a
m
; b
1
;    ; b
n
are atoms. It is in this form that we
generally present process clauses.
In this abstract, we choose sequents of the form  : 	  !   where  is the
signature (declaration of eigenvariables) and 	 and   are multisets of formulas
(linear/bounded maintenance). Backchaining over the clause above (that is,
applying a series of left-introduction rules) is equivalent to the following simple
inference rule
; y
1
; : : : ; y
j
: 	  ! b
1
; : : : ; b
n
; 
 : 	  ! a
1
; : : : a
m
; 
Here,  is a substitution mapping the variables x
1
; : : : ; x
n
to -terms and the
variables y
1
; : : : ; y
m
are not declared in  (otherwise we can use -conversion
on the clause before backchaining).
Example 2.1 Consider the problem of Alice wishing to communicate a value
to Bob making a possible use of a server. The clause
8x[(a x)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
...
b
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
s Æ  a
0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
(b
0
x)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
...
s];
illustrates how one might synchronize Alice's role (a x) with Bob's role b
and the server's role s. In one, atomic step, the synchronization occurs and
the value x is transfered from Alice, resulting in her continuation a
0
, to Bob,
resulting in his continuation (b
0
x): here the server's state is not changed. As
in most examples in this abstract, we use the Prolog convention of writing
implications in specication clauses in their reverse direction.
As this example illustrates, synchronization between roles is easy to specify
and can trivialize both the nature of communication and the need for security
protocols entirely. While the clause in this example might specify a desired
communication, it cannot be understood as capturing more low-level and re-
alistic aspects of communications. In distributed settings, synchronization ac-
tually only takes place between roles and networks. Our main use of multiset
rewriting will involve more restricted clauses with weaker assumptions about
communications: these will involve synchronizations between roles and net-
work messages (a model for asynchronous communications) and not between
roles and other roles (a model of synchronous communications). Clauses such
as the ones display above, however, can serve as specications of what a given
protocol might be shown to satisfy.
3 Encoding security protocols
The following encoding of security protocols follows to a large extent that
given in [4,5] for the system MSR.
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The type data is used to encode messages. Primitive objects, such as
integers, strings, and nonces, are all constructors of data. The tupling operator
h; i, for pairing data together, has type data ! data ! data. Expressions
such as h; ; : : : ; i denote pairing associated to the right. One additional
constructor for data is presented in Section 4.
A network message is encoded as an atomic formula of the form N(t),
where N() is a predicate of one argument of data and t (of type data) is the
actual data of the message. As we shall see, the state of the network will be
a multiset of such atomic formulas.
The roles (e.g., Alice and Bob) and the formulas that describe them are
rather complicated in MSR: we provide some denitions inspired by the de-
nitions given in [4,5]. A role identier is a symbol, say, . For some number
n  1 and for i = 1; : : : ; n, the pair 
i
of an identier and an index is a role
state predicate. These state predicates are used to encode internal states of
a role as a protocol progresses. A role state atom is an atomic formula of
the form 
i
(x
1
; : : : ; x
m
) where x
1
; : : : ; x
m
are distinct variables and 
i
is a role
state predicate. A role clause is a process clause
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where n;m  0, all the atoms a
1
; : : : ; a
m
; b
1
; : : : ; b
n
are either network mes-
sages or a role state atoms such that (1) there is at most one role state atom
in the head and at most one in the body; (2) if there is a role state atom
in the head, say, 
i
(

t) and a role state atom in the body , say, 
0
j
(s), then
 and 
0
must be the same role identier and i < j. In other words, a role
clause only involves a single role (and possibly network messages) and when
moving from the head to the body, the index of the role must increase. As a
consequence of the restrictions on role clauses, roles cannot synchronize with
other roles directly and one role cannot evolve into another role. Condition (2)
above implies is that all agents have nite runs [4,5]: suitable generalization
on those conditions can be accommodated by linear logic using the modal !.
A role theory is a linear logic formula of the form
9x
1
: : :9x
r
[C
1

    
 C
s
];
where C
1
; : : : ; C
s
are role clauses (as described above), where x
1
; : : : ; x
r
are
variables of type data or data ! data, and whenever C
i
and C
j
have the
same role state predicate in their head then i = j. This latter condition
implies that agents in protocols are deterministic. This is a condition that
can easily be relaxed within linear logic if non-deterministic agents are of
interest. Existential quantication surrounding logic programs are used to
provide for abstract data-types and here they will serve as local constants
shared by certain role clauses. In particular, shared keys between, say, Alice
and a trusted server, will be existentially quantied in this way with a variable
of type data ! data.
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4 Encryption as an abstract data-type
Encryption keys will be encoded using function symbols of type data ! data.
Since the scope of such keys will need to be given scope, they will be quanti-
ed either existentially over role theories or universally in role clauses. Using
higher-order quantication over data constructors is the usual way to specify
abstract data-types within logic programming [11]. Since we will be allowing
quantication of higher-order type, proof search will be slightly more com-
plicated than if we restricted ourselves to only rst-order quantication. For
example, the (meta-level) equations for , , and  conversions are assumed,
although no other equations on the type data are assumed. (As is custom-
ary with typed incorporating -terms,  is assumed since there seems to be
no good reason to distinguish, say, the encryption key k form the expression
(w:kw).) As discussed in [14], higher-order quantication can add greatly to
the expressive strength of specication, but when done carefully, it does not
need to add to the complexity of proof search. The remaining constructor for
the type data is 
Æ
of type (data ! data) ! data and this is used to coerce
an encryption key back into a data item, and in this way, a role can place a
key into a network message to communicate with another role. (We will not
introduce application app : data ! (data ! data), the dual operation to 
Æ
,
since the expression (app k
Æ
x) will be written simply as (k x).) This approach
to \encryption as an abstract data-type" is a departure from MSR.
Initially, the shared key occurs only in the specication of the code for the
roles that are able to communicate via this shared key. Consider, for example,
the following specication.
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P ) Æ  N(k
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P ): ]
(Here as elsewhere, quantication of capital letter variables is universal with
scope limited to the clause in which the variable appears.) In this example,
Alice (a
1
; a
2
) communicates with Bob (b
1
; b
2
) via a server (s
1
). To make the
communications secure, Alice uses the key k
as
while Bob uses the key k
bs
.
The server is deleted immediately after it translates one message encrypted
for Alice to a message encrypted for Bob. The use of the existential quantiers
helps establish that the occurrences of keys, say, between Alice and the server
and Bob and the server, are the only occurrences of that key. Even if more
principals are added to this system, these occurrences are still the only ones for
these keys. Thus, the existential quantier helps in determining the static or
lexical scope of key distribution. Of course, as protocols are evaluated (that
is, a proof is searched for), keys may extrude their scope and move freely
onto the network. This dynamic notion of scope extrusion is similar to that
found in the -calculus [15] and is modeled here similar to an encoding of the
-calculus into linear logic [12].
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Example 4.1 Consider the Needham-Schroeder Shared Key protocol [18]:
Message 1 A  ! S: A;B; n
A
Message 2 S  ! A: fn
A
; B; k
AB
; fk
AB
; Ag
k
BS
g
k
AS
Message 3 A  ! B: fk
AB
; Ag
k
BS
Message 4 B  ! A: fn
B
g
k
AB
Message 5 A  ! B: fn
B
  1g
k
AB
This protocol can be translated into the linear logic theory below:
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Notice that two shared keys are used in this example and that the server
creates a new key that is placed within data and is then used for Alice and
Bob to communicate directly. It is a simple matter to show that this protocol
implements the specication (taken from Example 2.1):
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The linear logic proof of this starts with the multiset a
1
(c), b
1
(), s
1
() on the
right of the sequent arrow (for some \secret" eigenvariable c) and then reduces
this back to the multiset a
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(c) simply by performing a simple \execution"
of the logic program in Example 4.1. Notice that the 8 used in the bodies of
clauses in this protocol are used both for nonce creation (at type data) and
encryption key creation (at type data ! data).
Example 4.2 Consider the following two clauses for Alice.
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M: (3:2)
In the rst case, she posseses an encryption key and uses it to decrypt a
network message. In the second case, it appears that she is decrypting a
message without knowing the key, an inappropriate behavior, of course. To
understand better what is happening in (3.2), notice that the following two
clauses are provably equivalent (in linear logic) to (3.2).
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M ]
These three clauses are indistinquishable with respect to provability. The last
one clearly illustrates that Alice is not actually decoding an existing message:
instead, she is simply guessing (using 9) at some data value M , and continues
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with that guess as a
0
M . If one thinks operationally instead of declaratively
about proof search involving clause (3.2), we would consider possible uniers
for matching the pattern (K M) with a network message, say, (k s), for two
constants k and s. Unication yields exactly the following three dierent
uniers:
[M 7! (k s); K 7! w:w] [M 7! a;K 7! k] [K 7! w:(k s)]
Thus, M can be bound to either (k s) or a or any term: in otherwords, M
can be bound to any expression of type data.
In the denition of a role clause, we disallowed existential quantiers in
the body of clauses essentially since this would allow agents to \guess" at data
(that is, pick non-deterministically a value). Now that we have moved to a
higher-order setting, we see by this example that we need to make an addi-
tional restriction since, as we have seen in the above example, decrypting with
a variable key is essentially the same as guessing and this must be restricted
as well.
We say that a variable occurrence in the head of an agent clause is rigid if
it is the scope of only constants or variables that have rigid occurrences. We
shall require agent clauses to be such that all quantied variables have rigid
occurrences.
By using higher-order quantication, logical entailment is strengthened
and can help in reasoning about role clauses and theories.
Example 4.3 Consider the following two clauses:
a
1
Æ  8k:N(k m) and a
1
Æ  8k:N(k m
0
):
Each of these clauses specify that Alice can take a step that generates a
new encryption key and then outputs a message (either m or m
0
) using that
encryption key. Since Alice has no continuation, no one, not even Alice will be
able to decode this message. It should be the case that these two clauses are
\operationally" similar since they both generate a \junk message." In fact, it
is an easy matter to show that these two clauses are logically equivalent. A
proof that the rst implies the second contains a subproof of the sequent
8k:N(k m
0
)  ! 8k:N(k m);
and this is proved by introducing an eigenvariable, say c, on the right and the
term w:(c m) on the left.
5 Abstracting internal states
The following example illustrates that using existential quantication over
predicates (in particular, role state predicates) allows interesting rewriting of
the structure of role theories.
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Example 5.1 [Reducing n-way to 2-way synchronization] General n-way syn-
chronization (n  2) can be rewritten using 2-way synchronization by the
introduction of new, intermediate, and hidden predicates as is allowed in role
theories. For example, let C
1
be the formula a
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f and let C
2
be the formula
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The formula C
1
described a 3-way synchronization and the spawning of 3 new
atoms whereas the formula C
2
is limited to rewriting at most two atoms into
at most 2 atoms. The formula C
2
is logically equivalent to C
1
: the proof
that C
2
` C
1
in linear logic is straightforward while the proof of C
1
` C
2
involves the two higher-order substitutions of a
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
b for 9l
1
and d
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
f for 9l
2
.
As long as we are using logical entailment, these two displayed formulas are
indistinguishable and can be used interchangeably in all contexts. If instead
we could observe possible failures in the search for proofs, then it is possible
to distinguish these formula: consider the search for a proof of a sequent
containing a and b but not c. Since logic does not observe such failures, this
kind of observation cannot be internalized.
Existential quantication over program clauses can also be used to hide
predicates encoding roles. In fact, one might argue that the various restrictions
on sets of process clauses (no synchronization directly with atoms encoding
roles, no role changing into another role, etc) might all be considered a way to
enforce locality of predicates. Existential quantication can, however, achieve
this same notion of locality, but much more declaratively.
Just as Example 5.1 illustrates that 3-way synchronization can be written
using 2-way synchronization via a hidden intermediary, intermediate states of
a role can also be hidden. For example,
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The changing of polarity that occurs when moving to the premise of a Æ  ips
expressions from output (e.g., N(m
1
)) to input (e.g., N(m
2
)), etc.
6 Asynchronous and synchronous connectives
This observation that abstracting over internal states results in an equivalent
syntax with nested Æ  suggests an alternative syntax for roles. Consider the
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following syntactic categories of linear logic formulas:
H ::= A j?j H
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.
..
.
.
.
..
H j 8x:H
K ::= H j H Æ  K j 8x:K
Here, A denotes the class of atomic formulas encoding network messages and
formulas belonging to the class H denote bundles of messages that are used as
either input or output to the network. Formulas belonging to the class K can
have very deep nesting of implications and that nesting changes phases from
input to output and back to input. If in the denition of K-formulas above
we write H Æ  H instead of H Æ  K, we are restricting ourselves to process
clauses (from Section 2). A formula in the category K is called a role formula.
The connectives of linear logic can be classied as asynchronous connective
(
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
, 8, &, etc) and synchronous connective (
, 9, , etc). The dual of a
connective in one class is a connective in the other. The formulas of MSR are
examples of bipolar : these are formulas in which no asynchronous connective
is in the scope of a synchronous connective. for example, Q
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is logically equivalent to Q
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role formulas are, in general, not bipolars.
Proposition 6.1 For every role theory in which only the predicate N() is
free, there is a collection of role formulas to which it is provably equivalent.
Proof. This proposition is proved by showing how to remove the existentially
quantied role state predicate with maximal index by generating the appro-
priate higher-order substitution (similar to those produced in Example 5.1).
When no more quantied role state predicates remain, the resulting theory is
the desired collection of role formulas. 2
Proposition 6.2 For every role formula, there is a role theory that is logically
equivalent.
Proof. This proposition is a simple consequence of Andreoli's \compilation"
of arbitrary linear logic formulas into bipolars [2]. The only dierence is that
the new predicate names created by the compilation need to be existentially
quantied in the resulting role theory. 2
To illustrate an example of this style of syntax, consider rst declaring
local all role predicates in the Needham-Schroeder Shared Key protocol in
Example 4.1. This then yields the logically equivalent presentation in Figure 1.
There, three formulas are displayed: the rst represents the role of Alice, the
second Bob, and the nal one the server. (All agents in this Figure are written
at the same polarity, in this case, in output mode: since Bob and the server
essentially start with inputs, these two agents are negated, meaning they rst
output nothing and then move to input mode.) The compilation mentioned in
Proposition 6.2 of the formula in Figure 1 yields the formulas in Example 4.1:
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(Out) 8na:N(halice; bob; nai) Æ 
(In ) (8Kab8En:N(kashna; bob; Kab
Æ
; Eni) Æ 
(Out) (N(En) Æ 
(In ) (8NB:N(KabNB) Æ 
(Out) (N(Kab(NB; secret)))))):
(Out) ?Æ 
(In ) (8Kab:N(kbs(Kab
Æ
; alice)) Æ 
(Out) (8nb:N(Kab nb) Æ 
(In ) (N(Kab(nb; secret)) Æ 
(Cont) b secret))):
(Out) ?Æ 
(In ) (8N:N(halice; bob; Ni) Æ 
(Out) (8k:N(kashN; bob; k
Æ
; kbs(k
Æ
; alice)i))):
Fig. 1. The roles of Alice, Bob, and a server
the new constants introduced by compilation are the names used to denote
role continuation.
The style of specication given in Figure 1 is similar to that of process
calculus: in particular, the implication Æ  is syntactically similar to the dot
prex in, say, CCS. Universal quantication can appear in two modes: in
one mode it is used to generate new eigenvariables (similar to the -calculus
restriction operator) and in the other mode it is used to bind to parts of input
messages (similar to value-passing CCS). The formula a Æ  (b Æ  (c Æ  (d Æ 
k))) can denote processes described as
a jj (b: (c jj (d: : : :))) or a: (

b jj (c: (

d jj : : :)))
depending on if it appears on the right or the left of the sequent arrow. Writing
it and its negation without linear implications, we have
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: : :))):
Consider a sequent   !   where  and   are multisets of K formulas.
Notice that once a process with a continuation (that is, one that has an im-
plication) has done an output (input), its continuation is an input (output)
process. Let A denote a multiset of atoms (i.e.,, network messages). Let  
and  be a multiset of role formulas (K-formulas). The right-hand side of se-
quents involve asynchronous behavior (output) and left-hand side of sequents
involve synchronous behavior (input). The two rules involving proof search
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with implications can be written as follows:
; K  !  ; H;A
  ! H Æ  K; ;A
H  ! A
1
  ! K;A
2
; H Æ  K  ! A
1
;A
2
Notice that we can assume that the left-introduction rule for Æ  is only done
when the right-hand side of the concluding sequent contains at most atomic
formulas.
If the three formulas in Figure 1 are placed on the right-hand side of a
sequent arrow (with no theory assumed on the left) then the role formula for
Alice will output a message and move to the left-side of the sequent arrow
(reading inference rules bottom up). Bob and the server output nothing and
move to the left-hand side as well. At that point, the server will need to be
chosen for a  ÆL inference rule, which will cause it to input the message that
Alice sent and then move its continuation to the right-hand side. It will then
immediately output another message, and so on.
7 Conclusion
We have illustrated how proof search in linear logic can be used to represent the
operational semantics of security protocols and how the meta-theory of linear
logic can be used to help deduct some simple equivalences between protocols.
In a full version of this paper, an interpolation theorem provides a simple
charactorization of communications between the principals in a protocol and
an intruder.
There is, of course, a great deal of work to do to see if linear logic and
this style of encoding can be used to establish security properties of particular
protocols.
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